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Abstract: The proliferation of international institutions means that states can be 
subject to multiple, overlapping and potentially incoherent international obligations. 
The regime complexity literature draws attention to this problem but says little about 
its character and causes. This article investigates whether and why two key 
components of the international economic surveillance regime – the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) – impose conflicting obligations 
on the same states. Based on a comparative sentiment analysis of more than 400 
surveillance documents and using differences in tone as a proxy for incoherence, our 
results show that the IMF was more pessimistic about member states’ economic 
policies before the global financial crisis but less so thereafter. Our results point 
towards the importance of discretionary authority rather than the distribution of 
power, with the EU and IMF responding to different rules with differing degrees of 
intensity, leading to incoherent assessments of member states’ economic policies.  
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In February 2001, Ireland received a public rebuke over its economic policy from the 
European Union (EU). By pursuing expansionary budgetary policies in spite of ‘an 
increasing extent of overheating’, the EU’s Council of Ministers (2001) concluded, 
the Irish government’s macroeconomic policy mix was ‘inappropriate’. Irish fiscal 
policy should have been ‘neutral rather than expansionary’, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded in August 2001, while praising the government’s tax 
policies (IMF, 2001). This difference of tone, though it should not be exaggerated, 
blunted the EU’s efforts to hold Irish authorities to account. Ireland’s Finance 
Minister Charlie McCreevy challenged the EU’s recommendation and the IMF’s 
analysis allowed him, as one commentator put it, ‘to make the point to Brussels that it 
is the EU…not Ireland that is out of step on fiscal policy’ (Clery, 2001).  
 This affair proved costly for Ireland, which allowed severe macroeconomic 
imbalances to accumulate, and for the EU, which was drawn a sovereign debt crisis 
that the unwinding of imbalances in this member state and others eventually triggered. 
Nor was it an isolated case. Tensions between EU and IMF surveillance are common, 
a high- level study concludes, because of differences in views about the effectiveness 
of policy instruments and because EU rules may, on occasion, prevent EU member 
states from following IMF policy (Task Force on IMF Issues of the International 
Relations Committee of the European System of Central Banks, 2015).  
Cases of this kind can be conceptualized as problems of incoherence in a 
regime complex. The concept of regime complexity was pioneered by Raustiala and 
Victor to explore the ‘array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions 
governing a particular issue-area’ (Raustiala and Victor, 2004: 279). Initially applied 
to the global governance of plant genetic resources, the last decade has seen empirical 
applications of this regime complex approach to intellectual property, human rights, 
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security and defense, climate change, refugees, maritime piracy, and election 
monitoring, reflecting the increased density of the international system. Incoherence 
occurs when the elemental components of a regime complex –typically, but not 
exclusively, international institutions – impose conflicting obligations on states. 
Existing studies in this field suggest that as institutions proliferate density and 
uncertainty intensifies (Keohane and Victor, 2011) so too does the probability that 
regime complexes will produce ‘multiple, possibly mutually contradictory, sets of 
regulations’ (Gehring and Faude, 2014). By providing actors with the ability to 
exploit opportunity structures (Farrell and Newman, 2014) and forum shopping 
opportunities to escape regulation or obtain a favorable outcome (Alter and Meunier, 
2009; Gomez-Mera and Molinari, 2014), incoherence weakens the credibility of 
international regimes (Drezner, 2009) and the effectiveness of international 
cooperation (Gehring and Faude, 2014). While these studies suggest that incoherence 
is costly for international governance, it is surprising how little we know about how to 
measure incoherence in regime complexes and its determinants. 
In this article, we are interested not in explaining the formation of a regime 
complex but in why the elemental components of an existing regime complex impose 
conflicting obligations on states. Specifically, we investigate the extent of – and 
factors driving – incoherence between two key players in the regime complex 
surrounding international economic surveillance: the IMF and the EU. The IMF is the 
premier global forum for international surveillance because of the universality of its 
membership and technical proficiency of its staff (Lombardi and Woods, 2008: 714). 
The EU goes well beyond the surveillance efforts of other regional orga nizations, in 
part, because of the governance challenges created by the euro (Savage and Verdun, 
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2016). The two organizations, in short, offer an excellent laboratory for studying 
regime complexity.  
This article provides the first, systematic test of two competing conjectures to 
explain incoherence in regime complexes. The first sees international organisations as 
treading softly with more powerful states and conjectures that the EU and IMF 
impose different obligations on states where these states wield different degrees of 
power within these institutions. The second sees EU and IMF as subject to rules that 
allow for different degrees of discretionary authority and so liable to impose different 
obligations on the same states as a result. Our aim is not to reduce the problem of 
incoherence to either of these explanatory variables but to conduct a systematic 
analysis of these two variables that could potentially be extended to other lines of 
inquiry. A major methodological innovation of this paper is to use sentiment analysis 
to measure incoherence in a regime complex. A method of quantitative text analysis 
with hitherto underexploited potential for students of international relations, sentiment 
analysis is used to derive a simple standardized measure of the tone of over 400 IMF 
and EU surveillance documents for the same group of EU member states over the 
period 1997-2014. Analyzing these documents as a whole rather than the 
recommendations within them, we treat differences in the tone of for the language 
used within as a useful proxy for measuring policy coherence. Positive tone indicates 
the validation of member states’ economic policies, whereas a negative tone brings 
with it an obligation to alter the status quo, albeit the kind of ‘soft’ obligation 
described by Simmons (2000) in her study of IMF surveillance. 
Our results reveal the extent of incoherence within this regime complex. On 
average, the IMF is found to be more pessimistic than the EU in its assessment of EU 
member states’ economic policies. The IMF was also significantly more pessimistic 
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before the global financial crisis but it was less pessimistic thereafter. Using linear 
and panel regression analysis, we explain such incoherence not by differences in the 
distribution of power within the EU and IMF but by differences in the discretionary 
authority that the two organizations enjoy in performing surveillance. The influence 
of agency discretion is stronger for the EU, which appears to be more constrained 
than the IMF in its judgment of members’ economic policies. 
The first section of this article explores the problem of incoherence in regime 
complexes before setting out competing theoretical explanations for why incoherence 
arises. The second discusses our decision to focus on IMF and EU economic 
surveillance and the methodology behind the sentiment analysis before presenting our 
findings. The final section summarizes our results and discusses their significance for 
wider debates in international relations and EU studies. 
The Problem of Incoherence in Regime Complexes 
The problem of incoherence, as we define it, describes a situation in which the 
constitutive elements of a regime complex impose conflicting obligations on the same 
member states. 1  Following Abbott et al. (2000: 401), we think of obligations as 
binding states such that their ‘behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the 
general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law, and often of domestic 
law as well’. Obligation is not a binary variable; it occurs on a sliding scale that 
ranges from binding legal rules to non-binding norms (Abbott et al., 2000: 404). We 
consequently conceive of incoherence as a spectrum that runs from a situation in 
which obligations imposed by institutions differ to a situation in which they are 
incompatible. In the extreme case of incompatibility, an international institution 
imposes obligations that require member states not to implement the obligations 
imposed by other institutions. In all other cases of incoherence, conflicting obligations 
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give rise to a situation where states choose, prioritize or balance among multiple 
courses of action. In what follows, we move beyond existing insights on the origins of 
incoherence by focusing on its endogenous sources. Specifically, we consider two 
major factors for the emergence of incoherence based on the combination of the 
literature on international regimes with the scholarship on international organizations. 
Though they do not capture all explanatory variables, they map into the broad debate 
on the influence of state power and discretion in international politics. 
 
Power Distribution: Scholars of regime complexity assume that state power shapes 
the formation and persistence of regime complexes (Keohane and Victor, 2011: 8-9). 
We go a step further by conjecturing that differences in the distribution of power 
within a regime complex drive incoherence. Specifically, we expect states to be 
subject to differing obligations from the elemental components of a regime complex 
in cases where such states wield different degrees of power within these elemental 
components.   
In thinking about the impact of power on incoherence we start from two 
assumptions. First, all other things being equal, more powerful states carry greater 
weight within international organizations. We would expect the constituent elements 
of a regime to tread more softly with states that wield more decisional or economic 
power because the former is more politically and financially dependent on the latter or 
because more powerful states are less compliant. Second, we assume that a state’s 
power is likely to vary across elemental components, inter alia, because the relative 
size of states varies according to their membership of international organizations and 
the governance structures of these bodies. Indeed, internal decision-making 
procedures – both formal and informal – are key for states to exercise their influence 
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(Stone, 2011). On this basis, we expect a state that wields greater influence within one 
international institution than another will, all other things being equal, face more 
stringent obligations from the first than the second. This accounts, to some degree, for 
why US President Donald Trump faced greater pressure in the G20 than the G7 over 
his withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Whereas the G7 summit in Charlevoix 
essentially took note of the difference between the United States and others members 
over the climate change accord (G7, 2018), all members except the United States 
signed up to a Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth at the G20 summit in 
Taormina in a show of support for the Paris Agreement (G20, 2018). In view of these 
considerations, we can formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Decisional power: The greater the differences in decisional power between the 
elemental components of a regime complex, the greater the potential for incoherence. 
 
H2: Economic power: The greater the differences in economic power between the 
elemental components of a regime complex, the greater the potential for incoherence. 
 
Discretionary Authority: A second factor that may produce incoherence in a regime 
complex lies in the differing degree of discretionary authority delegated to the 
elemental components of the regime. Viewed in principal-agent terms rules help 
principals to keep agents accountable, identify agency slack and thus punish it 
including via a revision to the terms of delegation (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 2013: 
64). Hence, principals may opt to specify the rules for agents to follow in the 
performance of their delegated functions as a way to minimize the probability of 
agents’ deviant behavior. For example, international institutions that act under rule-
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based delegation – the circumstance in which the state principal instructs the agent on 
how the agent has to pursue its mandate – are generally more constrained than 
institutions that operate under discretion-based delegation when it comes to imposing 
obligations on states (Hawkins et al., 2006: 27-8). Likewise, ambiguity and flexible 
institutional arrangements will, all other things being equal,  amplify the agent’s 
discretion (Doleys, 2009) thus enhancing the likelihood of the agent’s deviation from 
delegated goals. Agents are frequently assumed to be rogue in studies of international 
organizations but they can be dutiful (Cortell and Peterson, 2006), with dutifulness 
depending, inter alia, on the degree of internal fragmentation within such institutions 
(Graham, 2013). As such, the constituent elements of a regime complex may embrace 
institutional constraints that limit their own discretion rather than chaffing against 
them. 
While we see rules as determining discretion, the question of whether more or 
less discretion encourages international institutions to impose tighter or looser 
obligations on states is an empirical one. Dutiful agents will use their discretion to 
reinforce the interests of their principals, while overzealous agents may use discretion 
to impose more stringent obligations (Tallberg 2003). The more general theoretical 
claim that we wish to interrogate is that a regime complex in which the constituent 
elements are subject to different rules and hence different degrees of discretionary 
authority are more likely to impose incoherent obligations on states. Thus, for 
example, we might expect that the regime complex surrounding human rights in 
Europe will impose different obligations on states at times because the Court of 
Justice of the EU European Court of Human Rights operate under jurisdictions that 




H3. Design: The greater the differences in discretionary authority accorded to the 
elemental components of a regime complex, the greater the potential for incoherence. 
 
Power and design certainly do not exhaust the list of potential drivers of incoherence. 
For instance, a burgeoning literature has drawn attention to recruitment patterns and 
professional networks to explain the (different) behavior of international 
institutions (Ban, 2015; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2014). While it is plausible to 
foresee cases whereby incoherence arises because of variation in educational and 
professional backgrounds between officials in two institutions, we have not included 
in our empirical analysis a variable measuring the impact of professions for lack of 
comparable data between the IMF and the European Council and Commission.  
Data and measurement 
Case selection 
Today, most states have their economic policies monitored simultaneously by several 
intergovernmental organizations and other types of international institution. The G20, 
the G7, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the World Bank, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Financial 
Stability Board and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are just some of the 
bodies that make up this regime complex. Since countries may be members of more 
than one of these international bodies, national governments are under the gaze of 
many eyes and subject to multiple recommendations that need not necessarily cohere. 
This article focuses on two elemental components of this regime: the IMF and the EU. 
The interaction of other international institutions within this regime could be studied 
but the IMF and the EU provide an excellent starting point not only because their 
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policy assessments are highly consequential for domestic political battles (Newmann 
and Posner, 2018) but also because the institutions are frequently at odds (Broome, 
Homolar and Kranke, 2017). It could be argued that comparing IMF and EU 
surveillance is problematic because the IMF’s Articles of Agreement and EU Treaties 
impose differing degrees of obligation on states. Our response is that the obligations 
imposed by EU surveillance should not be overstated. To date, no financial penalties 
have been imposed on member states even through excessive deficits have been 
commonplace. 2  Following Simmons (2000), we see the Articles of Agreement as 
imposing low obligations on states rather than no obligation at all. Furthermore, like 
much soft law in international financial governance, IMF surveillance can be 
particularly powerful to the extent that it tilts domestic policy debates by empowering 
some actors over others (Newmann and Posner, 2018) and by providing trusted 
expertise (Broome, Homolar and Kranke, 2017). 
      
Sample 
Our analysis equates differences in the tone of IMF and EU surveillance with 
differences in the degree of obligations imposed on member states and so policy 
incoherence. Where states are simultaneously subject to positive and negative 
evaluations of their economic policies by these institutions, this creates ambiguity 
about their obligations, a negative assessment encouraging policy change and a 
positive assessment favouring the status quo. We focus on two key surveillance 
documents: Public Information Notices (PINs)3 and EU Council opinions on member 
states’ stability programs. These documents are central to the conduct of surveillance. 
PINs summarize the Executive Boards’ views on the Article IV reports prepared by 
Fund staff following their missions to member economies, which are usually 
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conducted on an annual basis. Under the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, EU member 
states submit stability (or convergence) programs each year that set out medium-term 
budgetary plans in compliance with the EU’s fiscal rules. It then falls to the Council, 
acting on a recommendation from the Commission to issue an opinion on these 
stability programs. 
When the IMF and EU believe that governments are implementing ‘good’ 
policies, surveillance reports should contain less pessimistic language and, 
consequently, less pressure to change domestic economic policies. The corollary of 
this point is that pessimistic language places a higher degree of obligation on a state 
than positive language; whereas positive language validates the economic policies of 
the state under review, we contend, negative language implies that states must change 
their economic policies either because of bad policy choices or worsening economic 
conditions or both. Furthermore, even if the EU and IMF are both pessimistic about a 
member states’ economic policy, the institution that is most pessimistic applies the 
most pressure. Specifically, we compare PINs issued by the IMF Executive Board for 
the EU 15 between 1997-2014 with Council opinions on member states’ stability 
programs during the same period. We focus on documents rather than 
recommendations contained within as this provides us with a richer view of 
surveillance documents and more documents. The combined corpus includes 442 
cases (i.e. documents) and around 595,000 words.  
To date, there has been no attempt that we know of to apply this methodology 
along these lines. 4  Hallerberg and Bridwell (2008) code differences between 
Commission recommendations concerning, and Council opinions on, stability and 
convergence programs between 1998 and 2007. Baerg and Hallerberg (2016) use a 
similar research strategy to investigate the differences between European Commission 
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assessments of member state economic programs and the assessment of the Council of 
Ministers. This analysis has the advantage of distinguishing between nature and 
content of the obligation imposed on member states, but it deals with just two 
categories – differences between Commission and Council texts and the precision of 
Commission recommendations – and so loses much of the semantic nuance in EU 
surveillance efforts. Turning to the literature on the IMF, Fratzscher and Reynaud 
perform a content analysis of all PINs for a group of emerging markets over the 
period 1996-2007 (Fratzscher and Reynaud, 2011). Each document in this corpus is 
coded according to its ‘favorableness’ towards national economic policies both 
overall and in terms of seven policy categories and 13 subcategories. Manual coding 
of a concept like favorableness, or indeed incoherence, can provide a rich picture of 
the obligations places on member states but the methodology raises serious concerns 
about reliability, as one coder’s view of what constitutes favorable may differ 
considerably from another’s, especially in documents that cover multiple policy areas 
(Krippendorff, 2012: 267-329). We redress this problem by combining an automatic 
content analysis of the words used by the IMF Executive Board and the EU Council 
of Ministers and a sentiment analysis that distinguishes between words with different 
connotations.  
 
Measuring Incoherence in Surveillance Reports 
We measure incoherence by using differences in the tone of the policy assessments 
issued by the IMF and the EU. When the IMF and EU believe that governments are 
implementing ‘good’ policies, surveillance reports should contain less pessimistic 
language. Conversely, when they believe that governments are not doing so, they 
should contain more pessimistic language. The uniformity and consistency of our 
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surveillance texts, as well as their clear structure and careful use of language makes 
them an ideal candidate for this methodology. Moreover, there is virtually no informal 
language or fundamental changes in the meaning of different words within our 
corpus. It is very unusual to have comparable sets of documents with all of these 
attributes, which lends credibility to our analysis.  
 
To measure the tone of each report, we use dictionary-based sentiment 
analysis. According to Loughran and McDonald (2011: 35), mainstream dictionaries 
fail miserably in financial contexts as the majority of words they identify as negative 
are not typically considered negative in the financial world. We use the sentiment 
dictionary that Loughran and McDonald developed to address this problem. When we 
apply their dictionary to our surveillance texts it generates word frequencies across 
the following categories: negative, positive, uncertain, strong, and weak words. 5 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of these words across our categories. It shows that 
the distribution is very similar across both types of surveillance, and that negative 





Figure 1. Categories of Language in International Economic Surveillance 
  
Like Tetlock (2007), we use principal components factor analysis (PCA) to derive a 
single, replicable, measure of tone, which incorporates all word categories. The 
results, presented in Table 1, show that across both EU and IMF texts the first 
semantic component is heavily loaded with negative, weak, and uncertain types of 
language. By contrast, the second component is dominated by positive and strong 
language and contains much less weak and uncertain language. Therefore, it can be 
said that IMF and EU reports that score higher on the first factor contain more 
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Table 1. Principal Components of Surveillance Texts 
EU sentiment 
 Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 
Negative  0.50 0.21 -0.10 -0.77 -0.29 
Positive 0.39 0.58 -0.53 0.41 0.22 
Strong 0.41 0.30 0.83 0.20 0.07 
Weak 0.46 -0.47 -0.10 0.41 -0.61 
Uncertain 0.45 -0.54 -0.06 -0.11 0.69 
IMF sentiment 
 Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 
Negative 0.46 0.21 -0.78 0.34 - 0.02 
Positive 0.35 0.51 0.00 0.77 - 0.01 
Strong 0.19 0.64 0.52 0.51 0.10 
Weak 0.54 -0.39 0.17 -0.03 0.71 
Uncertain 0.56 -0.33 0.28 0.04 - 0.6946 
Notes: 232 EU observations and 210 IMF observations from 1997-2014. 
Language Categories from Loughran and McDonald’s(2011) Financial 
Sentiment Dictionary. 
  
Figure 2 below illustrates the average pessimism in our corpus over-time and across 
institutions.
6
 It shows that incoherence is a proble m in international economic 
surveillance. On average, the IMF is more pessimistic than the EU but this masks 
variation over-time. While the IMF is more pessimistic on average, it has been the less 
pessimistic of the two since the global financial crisis. Before the crisis, a typical IMF 
assessment contained 34 per cent more pessimistic language than an EU assessment. 
Since the crisis, EU assessments have contained 53 per cent more pessimistic language.
7
 
Although the EU has moderated its language since 2010, it continues to be more 
pessimistic than its IMF counterpart. 
The type of language used in surveillance documents is best thought of as a 
controlled natural language, where grammar and vocabulary is restricted to remove 
ambiguity. This raises the possibility that the EU and IMF may use different 
procedures to control their use of sentimental words. However, an Independent-
Samples t Test shows that the difference of means in the use of sentiment-charged 
words between the EU and the IMF is not different from zero, suggesting that we can 
compare the sentiment produced by both institutions. In short, treating differences in 
 16 
the sentiment of surveillance as a proxy for the obligations imposed on states by the 




Figure 2. Median Pessimism in Surveillance Assessments 
 
Explaining Incoherence between IMF and EU surveillance 
Having presented evidence on the degree of incoherence between IMF and EU 
surveillance, this section moves on to explore the factors that explain differences in 
sentiment between the two sides using linear regression analysis. Our general 
approach is to ask whether differences in the tone of IMF and EU surveillance across 
EU member states are driven by differences in the distribution of power within the EU 
and IMF or in the discretionary authority granted to these institutions. To measure 
differences in tone, we subtract the EU’s pessimism score for a given country in a 


































































































same year. This exercise yields 156 observations of incoherence from 312 
surveillance missions between 1997 and 2012. During this period, there were 397 
episodes of EU-15 surveillance, including 206 EU Council reports and 191 IMF 
reports. We dropped 85 of these episodes because surveillance was delayed or 
deferred by at least one organization.8 Table 2 provides summary statistics for this, 
and all of the variables in our empirical tests. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources 
 N Mean Min Max SD Source 
Incoherence 156 0.50 -6.54 6.44 2.61 (1) 
EU tone 206 -0.16 -2.56 5.50 1.77 (1) 
IMF tone 191 0.11 -2.41 4.23 1.47 (2) 
Power Difference Index 156 -0.63 -2.49 0.64 1.03 (4) 
EU Penrose Index 240 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.09 (4) 
IMF Penrose Index 240 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.05 (4) 
Ex. Deficit Pro. 240 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.43 (3) 
WEO 215 0.03 -5.71 8.03 3.21 (3) 
Fiscal space 240 0.92 -5.60 24.41 2.02 (1) 
Δ Debt/GDP 240 0.01 -69.51 122.92 35.37 (3) 
Δ Current account/GDP 240 -0.06 -18.44 19.01 6.92 (3) 
Inflation (%) 240 0.03 -5.71 6.80 1.28 (3) 
Growth (%) 240 2.28 -8.86 10.78 2.83 (3) 
VIX Index 240 22.37 12.78 32.58 5.68 (7) 
Spread (%) 233 0.62 -1.30 21.00 2.03 (6) 
Austerity 224 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.48 (8) 
GDP (log) 240 6.19 3.02 8.17 1.30 (5) 
Deficit 230 0.03 -18.70 18.70 2.38 (3) 
GDP forecast 157 2.58 -3.00 8.80 1.71 (5) 
Notes: Variables collected for the period from 1997-2012. (1) EU Commission, (2) www.imf.org, (3) 
European Commission’s AMECO Database, (4) Leech and Leech (2005) (5) World Economic 
Outlook, (6) OECD, (7) Chicago Board Options Exchange, (8) IMF database of action-based fiscal 
consolidation; Ağca and Igan (2013) for 2010 and 2011, authors’ own calculations for 2012. 
 
To test our conjectures concerning state power and discretionary authority, our 
independent variables are operationalized as follows: 
 
Differences in the distribution of power: To measure decisional power we use 
Leech and Leech’s (2005) Penrose index of the voting power of EU member states in 
the IMF Board of Governors. This index measures the proportion of all IMF 
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Governing Board decisions in which a state could have a decisive say. A similar index 
is constructed for qualified majority votes within the EU’s Council of Ministers. We 
subtract the IMF and EU values of the Penrose indexes to create a single index which 
measures a state’s ability to exert leverage over at least one organization within the 
regime complex. In further robustness tests we use the separate indexes. Economic 
power is measured using the natural log of gross domestic product (GDP). This is an 
appropriate measure of economic power in the EU-15, which are all considered 
wealthy advanced economies but differ considerably in economic size. 
 
Differences in Discretionary Authority: The degree of discretionary authority 
granted to the EU and IMF via the rules underpinning economic surveillance varies. 
The Maastricht Treaty’s excessive deficit procedure not only sets out numerical 
targets for budget deficits and general government debt that member states are 
expected to meet but the steps that the European Commission and Council of 
Ministers must take to monitor and enforce these targets. 9 The Stability and Growth 
Pact is designed to clarify and expedite this degree of d iscretionary authority available 
to EU institutions narrows once a member state reports deficit and debt levels that 
breach the aforementioned numerical targets. For instance, the Council has four 
months, as a rule, from the date of this reporting to decide on whether an excessive 
deficit exists in this member state.10 IMF surveillance is more open ended but it does 
not take place in an institutional vacuum, with the recent literature suggesting that 
fiscal space is a key indicator for IMF surveillance (Ostry et al., 2010). Simply put, 
fiscal space refers to the room that states have to undertake discretionary policy 
without raising concerns about the sustainability of public debt or market access. 
Developed by the Fund in the 1990s, fiscal space relies on ‘qualitative evaluations of 
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a government’s reputation and track record…[with] assessments of quantitative fiscal 
data’ (Clift, 2018: 107) As a state’s room for fiscal space narrows so too, we assume, 
will the IMF’s discretionary authority. Fiscal space may not be as prescriptive as the 
EU’s fiscal rules but the former puts the onus on the Fund to steps up its interactions 
with the state in question. .  
To test whether differences in discretionary authority can explain incoherence 
in our regime complex, we ask the degree of pessimism expressed by the EU or IMF 
changes as the rules underpinning their respective surveillance regimes begin to bite. 
An EU treaty protocol establishes two reference values for assessing excessive 
deficits: a ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to GDP at market prices of 
3 per cent and ratio of government debt to GDP of 60 per cent. 11 We code separate 
debt and deficit dummy variables to record years where a state has breached one of 
the critical thresholds. Temporary breaches of these thresholds are allowed in some 
cases. Therefore, we code an additional dummy variable which takes a value of ‘1’ 
only when an EU member state is subject to an excessive deficit procedure. We 
follow Botev et al. (2016) by using two simple alternative measures of fiscal space. 
The first is the differential between interest rates and growth, which captures the 
extent to which the pace of economic growth can offset the impact of the interest rate  
on the debt ratio. The second is the ratio of government debt to tax revenue, which 
captures the tax years that it would take to repay government debt. In both cases, an 
increase in the indicator can be read as a reduction in fiscal space. 
Table 3 presents the findings from our linear regressions. The first column 
shows estimates that measure the impact of decisional and economic power. The 
second column includes our proxies for design features. The third column combines 
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both power and institutional constraint variables in a single specification. The fourth 
column adds an interactive term to capture potential interactions between our rule 
indicators and the last column adds alternative rule indicators. 
 
 
Table 3. The Determinants of Incoherence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Power Index -0.15  -0.35 -0.35** -0.45 
 (0.175)  (0.165) (0.159) (0.213) 
GDP (log) 0.06  0.05 0.05 0.14 
 (0.189)  (0.164) (0.161) (0.195) 
Ex. Deficit Pro.  -2.52*** -2.72*** -2.86*** -2.36*** 
  (0.426) (0.440) (0.501) (0.498) 
Fiscal space a  0.37** 0.33** 0.21 0.33** 
  (0.127) (0.118) (0.281) (0.124) 
EDP*Fiscal space a    0.16  
    (0.301)  
Deficit > 3     -1.11 
     (0.662) 
Debt > 60     0.16 
     (0.351) 
Fiscal space b     0.37 
     (0.473) 
      
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 
R-squared 0.006 0.209 0.231 0.232 0.264 
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
 
First of all, we find no support for the argument that differences in the 
distribution of power within the EU and IMF drive incoherence in the surveillance 
efforts of these organizations. The F-test associated with column 1 is low, indicating 
that our first model does not provide a better fit to the data than a model that contains 
no independent variable. Thus, it would seem that state power within the surveillance 
regime complex has little to do with incoherence, as measured by differences in the 
tone of surveillance reports. 
Our second major finding is that differences in discretionary authority drive 
incoherence between the IMF and EU (H3). Where the rules underpinning EU and 
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IMF surveillance bite – and so reduce discretionary authority – we find a bifurcated 
impact on the incoherence of economic surveillance. When an excessive deficit 
procedure is in effect, thus requiring EU institutions to initiate disciplinary 
proceedings, we detect a large and statistically significant decrease in incoherence.   
Specifically, the excessive deficit procedure is associated with an 96.5 per cent 
decrease in standard deviations of our incoherence variable. Our fiscal space indicator 
is also statistically significant and correlated with more incoherence. A unit increase 
in this indicator corresponds with less fiscal space. Therefore, less fiscal space is 
associated with greater incoherence. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in 
fiscal space is associated with 28 per cent of a standard deviation increase in 
incoherence. Column 3, which combines our power and discretionary authority 
variables, largely supports these findings. In this column, the substantive and 
statistical significance of the excessive deficit procedure and fiscal space are broadly 
similar.  
Column 4 introduces an interaction term between our EU and IMF 
institutional constraints. When considered separately, these indicators demonstrate the 
additive effect of changes in discretionary authority on incoherence; when interacted, 
however, the interaction term captures the possibility that different combinations of 
discretionary authority have compound effects that are greater than the sum of their 
separate effects. For example, in cases where fiscal space is increasing while the 
excessive deficit procedure holds, the EU is constrained while the IMF enjoys 
discretion. In such cases, we would expect a synergy that produces more incoherence 
than if both organizations enjoyed the same amount of discretion. However, the 
interaction term in column 4 which captures this possibility is not statistically 
significant while the constitutive term – the excessive deficit procedure – is 
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significant and substantively important. Thus, we find no evidence of compound 
effects in our sample. Rather, the evidence points towards the importance of the 
excessive deficit procedure as the most important factor in determining the extent to 
which the sentiment of both institutions is aligned or not, followed by fiscal space. 
In column 5, we introduce alternative rule measures, including separate debt 
and deficit dummy variables to record years where a state has breached one of the 
critical thresholds, and an alternative measure of fiscal space. These alternative 
measures are not statistically significant and our earlier findings regarding the 
excessive deficit procedure and fiscal space hold.12 
 
EU and IMF panel data tests 
To unpack these results, we explore the determinants of the pessimism scores 
produced separately by each organization using panel data techniques. The data 
consists of separate EU and IMF unbalanced panels of 15 countries between 1997 and 
2012. There were 397 episodes of surveillance during this period, including 206 EU 
assessments and 191 IMF assessments. We are missing data on some independent 
variables, described in Table 2, which reduces our IMF sample to 171 assessments 
across 14 countries. 
For our EU sample, we use the EU Penrose Index as our power variable and 
the excessive deficit procedure as our discretionary authority variable. For our IMF 
sample, we use the IMF Penrose Index and our two measures of fiscal space. Both of 
these latter measures are narrow, theoretically- informed proxies for the importance of 
discretionary authority. However, the literature also suggests that IMF assessments 
are broad and flexible and that they change dynamically (see Heller, 2002). Therefore, 
we complement our narrow measures with a broad measure of macroeconomic 
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performance based on the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, the IMF’s own 
formal assessment of economic performance. To construct our broad indicator, we 
aggregate all of the WEO’s 43 sub- indicators. First, we standardize the WEO to 
obtain Z scores for each of the 43 sub- indicators. Then we extract the first component 
using principal components analysis. The first component is loaded primarily with 
positive developments in the economy, including growth, government revenue, and 
employment. Therefore, an increase in the WEO measure can be read as a broad 
improvement in a country under surveillance, according to the IMF’s own 
methodology for measuring economic performance. 
Finally, in both samples we control for general macroeconomic conditions, 
including consumer price inflation, GDP growth, the fiscal deficit, government debt, 
the current account balance, and the VIX Volatility Index, a measure of market 
expectations of near-term stock market volatility. 
We detected heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan⁄Cook Weisberg test 
and therefore estimate Prais-Winsten models with panel-corrected standard errors. 
The Wooldridge test indicates autocorrelation, so we use the AR1 correction. We do 
not include country fixed effects because of the time invariant nature of some of our 
key independent variables. 13  The Wald test indicates no need to include dummy 
variables for each year.14 Inspection of the correlation matrix and variance inflation 
factors show that multicollinearity is not a cause for concern. 
Table 4 presents our findings. Columns 1-5 relate to EU sentiment. The first 
column presents our base specification, which includes proxies for decisional power, 
discretionary authority, and economic controls. The next column adds a variable 
measuring whether a state has exceeded the 3 percent deficit threshold. Column 3 
adds a variable measuring whether a state has exceeded the 60 per cent debt threshold. 
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Column 4 substitutes the log of GDP for the Penrose Index. Column 5 introduces the 
fiscal deficit to our base specification, reducing our sample by 9 observations. 
Columns 6-9 relate to IMF sentiment. Column 6 is the base specification, 
which includes proxies for decisional power, d iscretionary authority, and economic 
controls. Column 7 adds our measure of variation in the IMF’s own WEO Database. 
Column 8 substitutes the log of GDP for the Penrose Index. Column 9 adds the fiscal 
deficit, reducing our sample by 7 observations. 
Our results show that that no one factor is driving incoherence in this regime 
complex. The economic control variables suggest that the EU attaches greater weight 
to past economic performance than the IMF. A one standard deviation increase in 
economic performance, as measured by growth, is associated with a 0.24 standard 
deviation reduction in EU pessimism, according to Model 1. The current account 
balance and government debt are also associated with small spikes in pessimistic 
language.15 Neither the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, inflation, nor global 
economic conditions as captured by the VIX index are associated with the tone of EU 
or IMF assessments. 
In line with our earlier findings, there is no support for the argument that 
differences in the power of member states are responsible for incoherence in the tone 
of surveillance. The EU Penrose Index and the log of GDP are statistically 
insignificant. The IMF Penrose Index is significant but, contrary to expectations, an 
increase is associated with more pessimistic language in IMF surveillance. All other 
things being equal, EU member states with high degrees of economic and decision 
making power do not receive more favorable assessments under international 
economic surveillance, with the Fund but not the EU more likely to take a tougher 
line against such countries. 
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Table 4 confirm differences in the degree of discretionary authority are driving 
incoherence. The triggering of the excessive deficit procedure is associated with a 
large and statistically significant spike in pessimistic language.  The effect is large in 
the first year and persists for the time that a member state is under the procedure. 
Substantively, it is associated with a 0.94 standard deviation increase in pessimistic 
language, all else being equal.  The evidence linking IMF surveillance to discretionary 
authority is weaker but not inconsistent with our earlier findings regarding 
discretionary authority. Neither of our primary or secondary indicators of fiscal space 
are statistically significant, suggesting that the IMF may take a less rigid 
interpretation of surveillance. 16  However, our measure of variation in the WEO 
indicator is statistically significant and correlated with a reduction in pessimistic 
language (See Column 7). This measure captures primarily good economic 
performance across multiple indicators as defined by the IMF’s own criteria for 
measuring performance. 17  Substantively, an increase in this indicator is associated 
with a 0.41 standard deviation decrease in pessimistic language. This is less than the 
excessive deficit procedure but it increases by almost 50 per cent when we drop our 
economic control variables from the specification.18 However, this measure of fiscal 
space is not robust to the substitution of the Penrose index by the log of GDP (see 
Column 8).  
Overall, these findings speak to the fact that differences in the degree of 
discretionary authority enjoyed by the EU and IMF linked to underlying rules drives 
incoherence in the regime complex. Rule breaches from member states, in other 
words, push the EU and IMF to change the tone of their assessment of national 
economic policies. The fact that the institutions work under different rules and 
respond to them in different ways is a key driver of incoherence. Overall, these 
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findings underline the importance of discretionary authority in the surveillance 
regime. EU surveillance is influenced by compliance with the Treaty’s fiscal rules; it 
becomes systematically more pessimistic when states are not in compliance with these 
rules. This greater pessimism may push it closer to the IMF, which tends to be more 
pessimistic overall, thus reducing overall incoherence. Of course, it takes more than 
one organization to create a problem of incoherence. We found some evidence that 




Table 4. The Determinants of Pessimism in EU and IMF surveillance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 EU EU EU EU EU IMF IMF IMF IMF 
∆ Debt 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
∆ Current 
account 
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
∆ Inflation -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.052) (0.081) (0.079) (0.082) (0.081) 
Growth t-1 -0.15** -0.14** -0.15** -0.15** -0.15 0.13** 0.06 0.10 0.13** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.089) (0.063) (0.064) (0.067) (0.064) 
VIX 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.046) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) 
Penrose Index 1.97 1.84 2.06  1.28 7.45*** 15.86***  8.21*** 
 (1.766) (1.708) (1.727)  (1.966) (2.146) (3.988)  (2.263) 
Ex. Deficit  Pro. 1.57*** 1.55*** 1.57*** 1.59*** 1.74***     
 (0.346) (0.342) (0.344) (0.344) (0.458)     
Deficit  > 3  0.22        
  (0.226)        
Debt > 60   0.11       
   (0.147)       
GDP (log)    0.11    0.33  
    (0.110)    (0.255)  
Deficit      -0.11    -0.05 
     (0.062)    (0.067) 
Fiscal space       0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
      (0.035) (0.030) (0.038) (0.035) 
WEO       -0.19** -0.07  
       (0.075) (0.106)  
          
Observations 206 206 206 206 197 171 171 171 164 
R-squared 0.305 0.312 0.307 0.305 0.367 0.108 0.147 0.074 0.117 
No. of countries 15 15 15 15 15 14 14 14 14 




We also performed a series of further robustness checks, which are available 
as part of the replication materials. 
First, we repeated our analysis in Table 3 using country and year dummies. 
We also tested a variant of our incoherence variable, which subtracts the EU’s 
pessimism score in year t from the IMF’s score in year t-1, as well as repeating our 
Table 2 specifications with the WEO indicator. In all cases our findings are broadly in 
line with those already in Table 3. 
Second, we added a lagged dependent variable to our base specification of our 
panel data analysis. This specification is likely to yield biased estimates because the 
lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error terms for earlier periods. 
Nevertheless, our core results are robust to this specification. The lagged dependent 
variable is not a statistically significant predictor of EU assessments but it is 
associated with negative language in IMF sentiment. 
Third, we tested our theory using an alternative dependent variable in our 
panel analysis: the number of negative words from Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) 
financial sentiment dictionary. This measure is easier to interpret than our primary 
dependent variable but it sacrifices potentially valuable information in the many other 
types of language that appear in surveillance texts. The results are broad ly similar in 
terms of statistical significance and magnitude.  
Fourth, we added additional economic controls to the base specification of our 
panel analysis. Since the tone of surveillance may respond to both the level of 
economic performance as well as changes from one period to the next, we added both 
level and differenced economic performance variables. Because it is possible that 
changes in tone may be even greater during particularly good or bad times, we also 
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included quadratic terms to capture the possibility of a curvilinear relationship 
between sentiment and economic performance. To capture relative economic 
performance we added the difference between a country’s growth and average growth 
in the EU-15. In separate tests we added two variables which reduce substantially our 
sample size. The first is the spread against the ten-year German benchmark bond to 
control for a country’s position in financial markets. 19  The second is a dummy 
variable measuring whether a country implemented an austere budget in the previous 
calendar year as calculated by the IMF’s own database of action-based fiscal 
consolidation. These variables did not alter our core findings. 
Fifth, we tested the effect of the IMF’s GDP forecast on EU and IMF 
sentiment in our panel analysis. We lose approximately one third of our observations 
when this measure is included but we find that IMF assessments are more circumspect 
during periods of good performance: an increase in forecast GDP is statistically 
significant and associated with an increase in pessimistic language.  
Finally, we tested in our panel analysis an alternative measure of the deficit 
generated by the OECD but this did not yield a statistically significant result or alter 
the substance of our core findings.  
Conclusion 
Over the last two decades, the field of international relations has moved on from the 
study of individual institutions and regimes in isolation to study the interaction 
between them. Regime complexity is at the cutting edge of efforts to understand this 
new politics of global governance although further work needs to be done to 
understand the character and causes of incoherence within regime complexes. This 
article has examined the extent of – and factors driving – incoherence between two 
key players in the regime complex surrounding international economic surveillance: 
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the IMF and the EU. Our findings – based on a sentiment analysis of more than 400 
surveillance documents between 1997 and 2014 – points to the presence of 
incoherence in this regime complex. Tone serves as a proxy for coherence, with a 
pessimistic assessment imposing a soft obligation on states to change their economic 
policies and an optimistic assessment validating the status quo. Our results show that 
the IMF was more pessimistic than the EU about EU member states’ economic 
policies before the global financial crisis hit but that this trend was reversed thereafter. 
We find little evidence that differences in the distribution of power within the 
elemental components of this regime was decisive. Neither the IMF nor the EU 
treaded softly when dealing with economically or politically powerful states. Instead, 
our results point towards differences in discretionary authority as the key driver of 
incoherence. When the rules underpinning EU and IMF fiscal surveillance bite and 
reduce these institutions’ room for discretion, each institution tends to be more 
pessimistic. But the two institutions are responding to different rules with differing 
degrees of intensity, leading to incoherent assessments of member states’ economic 
policies.  
These results shed new light on the EU and IMF as institutions as well as the 
interaction between them. First, our findings challenge the idea that these institutions 
are dominated by large states (see Hallerberg and Bridwell, 2008). In their 
surveillance activities, at least, the EU and the IMF are willing to stand up to the most 
powerful states. Second, our analysis, confirms that rules matter for EU and IMF 
surveillance while encouraging a more nuanced interpretation thereof. The Stability 
and Growth Pact emerges in our account not as a rigid instrument of austerity but one 
that swings between more and less pessimistic assessments of member states’ 
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economic policies (Scharpf, 2015). The IMF, though critical of the EU’s approach to 
surveillance, is more beholden to rules than it looks (Annett et al, 2005). 
The focus of this article is on the causes rather than the consequences of 
incoherence in regime complexes but our findings invite reflection about the latter. 
The lack of coherence between EU and IMF surveillance, the regime complexity 
literature conjectures, will impede the effectiveness of economic surveillance by 
making it easier for EU member states to wriggle out of their obligations. Precisely 
what EU member states could and should have done prior to the global financial crisis 
is a matter of economic judgement but the IMF’s greater pessimism during this period 
lends weight to the view that it was the more vigilant economic watchdog and that the 
EU’s fiscal rules, as originally conceived, made the EU more rather than less attentive 
to the policy mistakes made by member states at this time. Since the global financial 
crisis hit, the EU has become bad cop to the IMF’s good cop. It is too soon to say 
whether this constitutes a case of over-vigilance by the EU or under-vigilance by the 
IMF but what is clear is that the problem of incoherence in relation to international 
economic surveillance persists. 
Our analysis is also relevant for wider debates in EU studies and international 
relations. The methodology and findings of this article respond to Henning’s call for a 
deeper study of regime complexity and institutional interaction, particularly as it 
relates to the role of non-European forces in European integration and governance 
(Henning, 2017: 28 and 258). It also chimes with ongoing debates about the 
importance of state size for influence in EU policy-making (Thorhallsson, 2017) and 
the constraining power of institutions in this domain (Heipertz and Verdun, 2011). 
Turning to the wider international relations literature, our findings may help to refine 
explanations of why some regime complexes enhance the effectiveness of 
 32 
international cooperation while others do not (see also Gomez-Mera, 2016). The 
headline message of this article is that assumptions about the degree of coherence 
within a regime complex is a matter for empirical investigation rather than something 
to assume a priori or explore through case studies alone. Finally, the methods 
employed in this article have wider application for EU and international relations 
scholars alike. While content analysis is now part of the political science tool kit, our 
analysis demonstrates the potential of sentiment analysis to generate new empirical 






                                                 
1
 Our definition builds on the definition o f coherence provided by Keohane and Victor (2011, 16) 
according to whom “A regime whose components are compatible and mutually reinforcing is 
coherent.”  
2
 The closest EU policy-makers have come to imposing such penalties was in August 2016 when the 
Council of Ministers cancelled proposed fines against Portugal and Spain. 
3
 Since July 2013, PINs have been replaced by a Press Release that serves much the same purpose. 
4
 One reason is that, before 1997, the number of published surveillance documents was limited. 
5
 The whole dict ionary can be downloaded from Loughran and McDonald’s website at 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists_files/LoughranMcDonald_MasterDict ionary_2014.xls x 
As per this dictionary, positive words include ‘always’ and ‘defin itely’. Weak words include ‘almost’ 
and ‘might’. Uncertain words also capture no sentiment but they are neither positive no r negative.   
6
 To calculate this figure we pool all of our documents and perform a principal component analysis of 
sentiment across our categories of language. A separate principal components analysis on each 
institution’s documents produces an almost identical figure. 
7
 This finding resonates with Baerg and Hallerberg  (2016: 975), who find that during the euro crisis the 
Council’s tendency to moderate the Commission’s assessment of Stability and Convergence 
Programme reduced. 
8
 The EU reports begin in 1998 and the IMF reports begin in 1997. There were 19 country -years where 
EU surveillance was delayed or deferred between 1998 and 2012, and 49 country -years between 1997 
and 2012 where IMF surveillance was delayed or deferred. 
9
 Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
10
 Article 3(3), Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997, amended by Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 
11
 Protocol (No 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
12
 Although we do not theorise interactions between power and discretionary authority, we tested 
models that involve interactions between our power and rules variables. In all cases, the interaction 
terms were not statistically significant and had weak explanatory power. 
13
 The Haus man test rejects the use of fixed  effects in a specificat ion that excludes time invariant 
independent variables. 
14
 However, our findings are robust to the inclusion of time dummies. 
15
 A one standard deviation increase in the current account balance as a percentage of GDP is 
associated with a 0.08 standard deviation increase in pessimistic language. 
16
 Our secondary measure of fiscal space is not displayed in Table 3. Results available in the replication 
set. 
17
 More specifically, the WEO variab le is the first component from principal components analysis 
(PCA) of the WEO dataset. The first component explains 23.8 per cent of the variation in this dataset. 
Approximately  10 of the 43 WEO variables contribute the most to this component particularly  growth, 
government revenue and employment. 
18
 Models without economic controls are available in the replication set. 
19
 This is because the German bond is usually regarded as the main driver of the price of all other bonds 
in the EU-15. 
 
References 
Abbott, K. W., Keohane, R.O., Moravcsik, A., Slaughter A. M. and Snidal D. (2000) The 
Concept of Legalization. International Organization 54 (03):401-19. 
Alter, K. J. & Meunier, S. (2009). The Politics of International Regime Complexity. 
Perspectives on Politics 7(1):13–24. 
Annett, A.M., Decressin, J. and Deppler, M. (2005) Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact, 
IMF Policy Discussion Paper No. 05/2. 
 34 
                                                                                                                                            
Ban, C. (2015) Austerity Versus Stimulus? Understanding Fiscal Policy Change at the 
International Monetary Fund since the Great Recession. Governance: An International 
Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions 28(2):167–83. 
Baerg, N. R. and Hallerberg, M. (2016) Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth 
Pact The Contribution of Member State Power and Euroskepticism to the Euro Crisis. 
Comparative Political Studies 49(7): 968-1009. 
Botev, J. et al. (2016) A Re-assessment of Fiscal Space in OECD Countries. OECD Economic 
Working Papers ECO/WKP (2016)76 
Broome, A., Homolar, A., and Kranke, M. (2017) 'Bad science: International organizations 
and the indirect power of global benchmarking', European Journal of International 
Relations. 
Clery, C. (2001) IMF Report to Praise Irish Tax Reforms. Irish Times, 3 August. 
Clift, B. (2018) The IMF and the Politics of Austerity in the Wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Copelovitch, M. S. (2010) Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of 
IMF Lending. International Studies Quarterly 54(1): 49–77. 
Cortell, Andrew P., and Susan Peterson (2006) 'Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? 
Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO''. In Delegation and Agency in 
International Organizations, Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and 
Michael J. Tierney, eds., pp. 255–280. Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press. 
Council of Ministers of the EU (2001) 2329th Council meeting (ECOFIN) Brussels, 12 
February 5696/01 (Presse 35). 
Doleys, T. (2009) Incomplete contracting, commission discretion and the origins of EU 
merger control. Journal of Common Market Studies 47(3): 483-506. 
Douglas-Scott, S. (2006) A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing 
European Human Rights Acquis Common Market Law Review 43(3) 629-665. 
Drezner, D. W. (2009) The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity. 
Perspectives on Politics 7(1):65–70. 
Farrell, H. and Newman, A. L.. (2014) Domestic Institutions Beyond the Nation-State: 
Charting the New Interdependence Approach. World Politics 66(2):331–63. 
Fratzscher, M. and Reynaud, J. (2011) IMF Surveillance and Financial Markets–a Political 
Economy Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy 27(3):405–22. 
G8 (2018) The Charlevoix G7 Summit Communique. Full text available at: 
https://g7.gc.ca/en/official-documents/charlevoix-g7-summit-communique/ 
G20 (2017) G20 Hamburg Climate  and Energy Action  Plan for Growth. Full text available 
at: http://unepinquiry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/Climate_and_Energy_Action_Plan_for_Growth.pdf 
Gehring, T. and Faude, B. (2014) A Theory of Emerging Order within Institutional 
Complexes: How Competition among Regulatory International Institutions Leads to 
Institutional Adaptation and Division of Labor. The Review of International Organizations 
9(4): 471–98. 
——— (2013) The Dynamics of Regime Complexes: Microfoundations and Systemic 
Effects. Global Governance 19(1):119–30. 
Gómez-Mera, L. (2016) Regime complexity and global governance: The case of trafficking in 
persons. European Journal of International Relations 22 (3):566-95. 
Graham, E.R. (2013) International organizations as collective agents: Fragmentation and the 
limits of principal control at the World Health Organization. European Journal of 
International Relations 20(2): 366-390. 
Hallerberg, M. and Bridwell, J. (2008) Fiscal Policy Co-ordination and Discipline: The Crisis 
of the Stability and Growth Pact and Domestic Fiscal Regimes. In K. Dyson, ed., The Euro 
at Ten: Europeanization, Power and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 69–
86. 
Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D.A., Nielson, D.L. and Tierney, M.J., eds,  (2006) Delegation under 
Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory. In Delegation 
 35 
                                                                                                                                            
and Agency in International Organizations, Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. 
Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, eds., pp. 1–38. Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press. 
Heipertz, M. and Verdun, A. (2011) Ruling Europe : The Politics of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Henning, R. C. (2017) Tangled Governance: International Regime Complexity, the Troika, 
and the Euro Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
IMF (2001) Ireland: 2001 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report and Public Information 
Notice on the Executive Board Discussion. IMF Country Report No. 1/139. 
IMF (2015) Global Prospects and Policy Challenges: G-20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors Meeting. 4–5 September. Ankara (Turkey).  
IMF (2016) Assessing Fiscal Space: An Initial Consistent Set of Considerations. IMF Staff 
Paper, December. Washington DC: IMF. 
Keohane, R. O., and Victor D. G. (2011) The Regime Complex for Climate Change. 
Perspectives on Politics 9(1):7–23. 
Krippendorff, K. (2012) Content Analysis; An Introduction to its Methodology. 3rd Edition.  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Leech, D. and Leech, R. (2005) Voting Power Implications of a Unified European 
Representation at the International Monetary Fund. LSE Research Online. 
Lombardi, D. and Woods, N. (2008) The politics of influence: An analysis of IMF 
surveillance. Review of International Political Economy 15(5): 711-739. 
Loughran, T. and McDonald, B. (2011) When Is a Liability Not a Liability? Textual Analysis, 
Dictionaries, and 10-Ks. The Journal of Finance 66(1):35–65. 
Lütz, S., and Kranke, M. (2014) 'The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and 
IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries' Review of International Political 
Economy, 21(2), 310-338. 
Morin, J., and Orsini, A. (2014) Policy coherency and regime complexes: the case of genetic 
resources Review of International Studies, 40(02), 303-324. 
Newmann, A.L., and Posner, E. (2018) Voluntary Disruptions: International Soft Law, 
Finance, and Power Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ostry, J. D., Ghosh, A.R., Kim, J.I., Mahvash, S.Q. (2010) 'Fiscal space' IMF Staff Position 
Note 10/11. 
Pisani-Ferry, J. et al. (2011) An Evaluation of IMF Surveillance of the Euro Area. Brussels: 
Bruegel. 
Raustiala, K. and Victor, D. G. (2004) The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources. 
International Organization 58(2):277–309. 
Savage, J.D., and Verdun, A. (2016) 'Strengthening the European Commission's budgetary 
and economic surveillance capacity since Greece and the euro area crisis: a study of five 
Directorates-General'. Journal of European Public Policy 23(1): 101-118. 
 
Scharpf, F. W. (2015). Political legitimacy in a non-optimal currency area. Democratic 
politics in a European Union under stress, 19-47.  
Seabrooke, L. and Tsingou E. (2014) 'Distinctions,  affiliations,  and  professional  knowledge  
in  financial  reform  expert  groups'  Journal  of   European  Public  Policy  21(3):  
389-407.  
Simmons, B. A. (2000) The legalization of international monetary affairs. International 
Organization, 54(3), 573-602. 
Stone, R.W. (2011) Controlling Institutions. International Organizations and the Global 
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stone Sweet, A., & Brunell, T. L. (2013) 'Trustee courts and the judicialization of 
international regimes: The politics of majoritarian activism in the European convention on 
human rights, the European union, and the world trade organization', Journal of Law and 
Courts, 1(1), 61-88. 
Tallberg, J. (2003) European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making States 
Comply (London: Routledge). 
 36 
                                                                                                                                            
Task Force on IMF Issues of the International Relations Committee of the European System 
of Central Banks (2015) 'IMF Surveillance in Europe (Frankfurt A.M.: IMF). 
Tetlock, P. C. (2007) Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock 
Market. The Journal of Finance 62(3):1139–68. 
Thorhallsson, B. (2017) The role of small states in the European Union. London: Routledge. 
 
 
